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Abstract
This article aims to identify the determinants of the capital structure of Brazilian companies and compare 
it with financial theories. In addition, the normality periods (2007, 2009–2014) and financial crisis periods 
(2008 and 2015) will be considered in the analysis. The sample has 114 Brazilian public companies in the pe-
riods from 2007 to 2015. The methodology used for data analysis was multiple regression for panel data. The 
results showed that there are differences between the determinants of the capital structure in periods of crisis 
and of normality. Some of the hypotheses tested were accepted. These hypotheses relate financial theory to 
empirical analysis. Finally, the research contributed by demonstrating the main determinants of the capital 
structure in the analyzed periods, showing changes between such determinants.
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Este artículo tiene como objetivo identificar los determinantes de la estructura de capital de las em-
presas brasileñas y compararlas con las teorías financieras. Además, los periodos de normalidad (2007, 
2009-2014) y los períodos de crisis financiera (2008 y 2015) se considerarán en el análisis. La muestra 
tiene 114 empresas brasileñas en los períodos de 2007 a 2015. La metodología utilizada para el análisis de 
los datos fue la regresión múltiple para datos en panel. Los resultados mostraron que existen diferencias 
entre los determinantes de la estructura de capital en períodos de crisis y de normalidad. Algunas de las 
hipótesis probadas fueron aceptadas. Estas hipótesis relacionan la teoría financiera con el análisis empíri-
co. Por último, la investigación contribuyó presentando los principales determinantes de la estructura de 
capital en los períodos analizados y evidenciando cambios entre estos determinantes.
Códigos JEL: G01, G15, G31
Palabras clave: Estructura de capital, Endeudamiento, Finanzas corporativas.
Introduction
The capital structure has been gaining prominence over the years, and it is one of the most 
important and complex contents in corporate finance (Espinola, 2013). The concept of capital 
structure is related to the forms of financing of companies. There are two forms of financing, 
equity and debt. But there is not consensus in financial theory about the best form of financing 
(Santos et al., 2009).
Durand (1952) was one of the leading researchers in a problem in a quantitative form. 
However, Modigliani and Miller (1958) created the first theory of capital structure. They argued 
that the capital structure was not essential to measure the value of companies. Recently, authors 
refuted this theory. They proposed a new theory. It showed an increased value of the companies 
(Fama; Barros; Silveira, 2001).
There are several external elements that affect the form of financing of companies. Credit 
offers and interest rates are some examples of these external elements. However, Intrinsic 
organizational factors also have effects. Internal elements that affect the form of financing are 
size of company, operating margin, and leverage. Therefore, capital structure theories analyze 
the main causes of the companies’ indebtedness. The main theories are Static Trade-off Theory, 
Agency Theory, Pecking Order Theory, and Market Timing Theory (Espinola, 2013).
Considering previous empirical studies about capital structure theory, this research attempts 
to answer the question: are the determinants of the capital structure in Brazilian companies 
different in times of crisis?
The main motivation for this paper is to assess whether there is a distinct behavior among 
the determinants of the capital structure in the above periods, in order to compare the results 
with the research hypotheses, which were built grounded on the four main theories of capital 
structure (Static Trade-off theory, Agency theory, Pecking Order Theory, and Market Timing 
Theory).
Finally, this paper aims to identify the determinants of the capital structure of Brazilian 
publicly-held companies and, specifically, through the results of the regressions, determine 
whether there were deviating behaviors between the periods. Therefore, the general hypothesis 
tested shows that companies may present different relationships in some determinants of the 
capital structure. It occurs in both periods, normality and crisis periods.




The capital structure research is grounded on a central issue that concerns the company’s 
value in relation to the way it is financed. Numerous variations, innovations, and theoretical 
perspectives on indebtedness of organizations have emerged in opposition to the pioneer and 
classical theories of Modigliani and Miller (1958). There are four main theories (Static Trade-
off Theory, Agency Theory, Pecking Order Theory, and Market Timing Theory), which try 
to consistently establish an optimal point of debt for companies to take full advantage of the 
benefits offered by debts (Brito, 2007). 
Static trade-off theory
The theory presents the idea that there is an optimal capital structure. There is a combination 
of equity and debt that is able to increase the value of the company. Debt utilization generates 
two opposite implications: tax benefit (positive effect) and bankruptcy costs (negative effect) 
(Santos et al., 2009). It is necessary for companies to seek a capital structure that will maximize 
the benefits and minimize debt costs (Bastos; Nakamura, 2009).
According to Myers (1984), companies should gradually replace equity with debt and vice 
versa to an equilibrium point at which it is possible to reduce the costs and increase the value 
of the company.
Asymmetric information and Pecking Order Theory
Pecking Order theory is the approach that determines the optimal capital structure. It is 
based on minimizing inefficiency in the companies’ investment decisions (Myers; Majluf, 
1984; Myers, 1984).
The idea presented by Myers and Majluf (1984) is based on information asymmetry between 
managers and investors, i.e., managers have more and better information on investment options 
and financing, to the point of prioritizing the opportunity that will bring lower risk to the 
company.
Thus, Myers (1984) developed the Pecking Order Theory that determines a hierarchy in 
the sources of funding: firstly, using the retained earnings as sources of financing; secondly, 
acquiring new debt; and, ultimately, issuing shares to obtain resources. This structure is 
maintained even if the shares are overvalued.
Market timing theory
In a globalized environment it is clear that a range of factors can influence the value and the 
capital structure of an organization, and according to Frank and Goyal (2009) managers follow 
two lines regarding capital structure decisions: suspend the financing decision for as long as 
possible if the conditions are not favorable or take advantage of unusual opportunities even if 
there are no needs.
The Market Timing Theory explains that a company with greater financial leverage obtains 
funds when its market value is low. Companies that show lower leverage capture external 
resources when the market value is high (Baker; Würgler, 2002). Hovakimiam (2006) stated 
that in a warm market the issuance of shares that are held exerts no influences on capital 
structure. In contrast, Alti (2006) shows that in a warm market companies enjoy the opportunity 
to issue more shares, overvaluing them and reducing debt. However, after overvaluation period 
companies increase their debts.
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However, Alti (2006) also shows that the theory is an important determinant of financing 
activity, but only for the short term.
Agency theory
Debt utilization is key to the emergence of conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers (Ross; Westerfield; Jaffe, 2002). Thus, because of such conflicts, Mendes et al. 
(2009) show that the agency theory can be understood as the costs that come from the purpose 
of resolution of these conflicts, since managers and shareholders intervene in defense of their 
own interests.
Grinblatt and Titmman (2005) elucidate that high company debt may be more favorable for 
shareholders as it would limit managers to adopt effective measures in personal terms and to 
expand the company more rapidly than advisable. On the other hand, managers prefer a smaller 
debt than the optimal point because it reduces the bankruptcy risk and also does not restrict 
management.
According to this theory, the optimal debt is defined by minimizing the total agency cost 
(Mendes et al., 2009).
The economic crisis variable
Effects of the globalization of economic crises have many critical consequences for public 
companies (Berger; Turtle 2011). According to Espinola (2013) the cause of crisis is related to 
financial bubbles. They create macroeconomic effects in chains that affect several countries. 
Their influence is negative on companies. This causes insolvency, affects interest rate, growth, 
and other microeconomic factors.
The study indicates financial innovations as one of the determinants of crisis. This is related 
to the nature of innovation in the competitive financial services industry (Thakor, 2012). More 
generally, Mitchell (1941) pointed out that the scope of business crises is due to the fact they 
are an intrinsic part of the corporate market.
Therefore, global financial crises make it difficult for companies to maintain their capital 
structures. It can make companies make the wrong decisions (Espinola, 2013).
Methodology
This methodology was based on papers about public companies’ capital structure. The 
objects of study were companies listed in the Brazilian stock exchange from 2007 to 2015. The 
sample consisted of all public companies in the aforementioned period. However, companies 
which had no financial statements available for the entire period of analysis were eliminated 
from the sample, therefore remaining 114 companies. The panel consists of 1,026 observations: 
228 in crisis periods (2008 and 2015) and 798 in normality periods. The data were taken from 
the Bloomberg database.
Considering the research focus on evaluating the determinants of the capital structure in 
financial crisis periods, Brazilian companies were considered because of the crises that the 
country faced in 2008 (financial crisis) and 2015 (political and economic crisis). 
Operational definition of variables
Variables analyzed in the present study were divided between dependent and independent 
variables.




Regarding the dependent variables, the research was based on previous studies such as 
Shyam Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), Leary and Roberts (2010), and 
Espinola (2013). Debt indicators were treated at book value.
Table 1 
Dependent variables and formulas
Dependent Variable Formula
TD: Total Debt = (Short-Term Debt + Long-Term Debt) / Total Asset
STD: Short-Term Debt = Short-Term Debt / Total Asset
LTD: Long-Term Debt = Long-Term Debt / Total Asset
Total Debt: it indicates the percentage of short-term and long-term debt in relation to the 
company’s assets; the higher this percentage, the higher the company’s leverage level. When 
the TD index is high, it shows that there is great dependence on debt.
Short-Term Debt: it indicates the percentage of short-term debt in relation to the company’s 
assets.
Long-Term Debt: it indicates the percentage of long-term debt in relation to the company’s 
assets.
The three variables of indebtedness were chosen to evaluate whether there are specific 
drivers, according to the type of indebtedness. The financial literature has more research 
evaluating the long-term debt. Short-term indebtedness is little discussed in the literature.
Independent variables
The definition of independent variables was performed through an adaptation of empirical 
studies (Booth et al., 2001; Brito; Corrar; Batistella., 2007, Nakamura et al., 2007; Bastos; 
Nakamura, 2009; Frank; Goyal, 2003; Espinola, 2013).
Table 2 
Independent variables and formulas
Independent Variable Formula
Operating margin = Operating Incomes / Total Revenue
Size = ln Total Revenue
Tangibility = Permanent Asset / Total Asset
ROE: Return On Equity = Net Profit / Equity
Growth = Total Revenue (t) / Total Revenue (t-1)
Tobin’s Q ratio = (Total Market Value + Total Debt) / Total Asset
Altman Z-score = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5
Note: EBIT corresponds to Earnings Before Interest and Taxes. X1 corresponds to working capital / total assets. X2 
corresponds to retained earnings / total assets. X3 corresponds to earnings before interest and taxes / total assets. X4 
corresponds to market value of equity / book value of total liabilities. X5 corresponds to sales / total assets
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Operating margin: it indicates the percentage between the operating incomes and revenues. 
According to the Pecking Order Theory, presented by Brealey and Myers (2006), companies 
that show profits tend to use equity instead of debt. Therefore, their relation is inversely related 
to the level of indebtedness.
Size: expressed by the log of the revenues. By theory, larger firms tend to have low default 
risk, lowering the cost of borrowing. It has a direct effect on indebtedness.
Tangibility: it indicates the percentage of fixed assets in relation to total assets. Companies 
with more physical structures have greater tangibility.
ROE: it reflects the percentage of return on equity. Theories show that there is a discordance 
of analysis. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), because of Agency problems, managers 
seek to retain the company’s excess profits to make investments. Researchers show that 
companies committed to debt tend to have agency problems. Thus, according to the trade-off 
model, the most profitable companies should be the most leveraged. However, according to the 
Pecking Order Theory, described by Myers (1984), excess of profit generates high indexes of 
reinvestment, which eliminates the necessity of searching for third-party capital. Therefore, the 
ratio is inverse to the level of leverage.
Growth: it indicates the percentage of growth of revenue over time. According to the 
Pecking Order Theory: the higher the revenue growth, the lower the need for debt.
Tobin’s Q ratio: this ratio was developed by Tobin (1969) and shows the relation between 
the market value, given by the expectation of future earnings, and the company’s book value. 
According to theories, companies with high indebtedness tend to add more market value.
Altman Z-score: The Z-score was developed by Altman (1968). It is an indicator of credit 
risk. It is used to forecast bankruptcies of companies. It is calculated from multiple income and 
corporate balance values to measure the financial health of a company.
Hypotheses for normality periods
H1: The relationship between operating margin and debt is negative;
H2: The relationship between size and debt is positive;
H3: The relationship between tangibility and debt is negative;
H4: The relationship between ROE and debt is negative; 
H5: The relationship between Altman Z-score and debt is negative; 
H6: The relationship between expected growth (Tobin’s Q ratio) and debt is positive; 
H7: The relationship between growth and debt is negative; 
 
Data processing and statistical tests
In the study it was used a regression analysis with panel data, unbalanced. To this end, it 
was tested the hypothesis of two regression models, Fixed and Random, through the Hausman 
specification test, proposed by Hausman (1978). It was used Eviews 7 software for test and 
regression statistics. It has been widely used by many researchers in the area (Nakamura et al., 
2007, Brito, Corrar; Batistella, 2007; Bastos; Nakamura, 2009; Frank; Goyal, 2003; Almeida 
et al., 2004; Espinola, 2013).




Debti,t = α + β1 OMi + β2 SIZi + β3 TANGi + β4 ROEi + β5 GROWi + β6 Q-TOBI + β7 Alt-Zi + µ
where:
- Debt represents the debt dependent variables (or the debt/asset ratio).
- α is the line intercept.
- β are angular coefficients. 
- µ capture errors in the model estimation
- i represents the company
- t represents the period (time).
Validation of the regression model
The validation of the regression model was made by testing for the absence of multicollinearity 
and independence of residuals. Multicollinearity is the phenomenon of correlation between 
variables. Their evidence occurs when the R² of the regression is high and the variables are 
not significant. To this end, we analyzed the correlation matrix between the variables and the 
significance of the parameters. Residual dependence occurs when the regression’s errors are 
autocorrelated. To this end, the serial autocorrelation test proposed by Durbin and Watson 
(1971) was used.
Table 3
Pearson Correlation Matrix (normality period)
 Operating Margin Size Tangibility ROE Growth Tobin’s Q Altman Z
Operating Margin 1.000
Size 0.186 1.000
Tangibility -0.063 0.160 1.000
ROE 0.314 0.148 -0.061 1.000
Growth -0.047 -0.053 -0.038 0.005 1.000
Tobin’s Q 0.012 0.036 0.027 0.043 0.000 1.000
Altman Z 0.057 0.100 -0.041 0.164 -0.018 0.037 1.000
Results and discussion
The correlation matrix was performed (Table 3 and Table 4) between the independent 
variables in order to determine multicollinearity (if it is established, there is a problem of 
almost exact linear relationship between these variables, reducing the quality of the regression). 
However, there is a correlation between ROE and Operating Margin variables. The variables 
have the same input (net profit) in the calculation. However, as the correlation was lower than 
0.5, as recommended by Gujarati and Porter (2008) the effect of multicollinearity cannot 
be disregarded.
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Table 4  
Pearson Correlation Matrix (crisis period)
 Operating margin Size Tangibility ROE Growth Tobin’s Q Altman Z
Operating margin 1.000
Size 0.192 1.000
Tangibility 0.103 0.152 1.000
ROE 0.256 0.134 0.112 1.000
Growth -0.060 -0.208 -0.109 -0.007 1.000
Tobin’s Q 0.135 0.173 0.068 0.125 -0.083 1.000
Altman Z 0.236 0.088 -0.120 0.341 0.093 0.262 1.000
The low values of the correlations between the dependent variables suggest that there is no 
multicollinearity effect on the data. Thus, it is not necessary to test multicollinearity using the 
Farrar and Glauber (1967) test.
It was also performed the Durbin-Watson test (Table 5), which is based on the assumption 
that the errors in the regression model are generated from the previous observation, i.e., it 
correlates the errors of the current regression model with the previous one. Results close to 2 
indicate independence of the residuals, validating the proposed regression model (Brito, 2007).
Table 5 
Durbin-Watson Test
  Normality Period Crisis Period
Durbin-Watson
Short-Term Debt 2.07 1.83
Long-Term Debt 1.97 1.90
Total Debt 2.04 2.06
Note: The asymptotic limits for the t statistics at the 1% and 5% levels. Considering the level of significance at 1%, 
the numbers of DW statistic are 1.603 (DL) and 1.746 (DU).
Durbin-Watson statistic for all models indicated the acceptance of null hypotheses for 1% 
levels. It indicates that regression residuals are independent. There is no serial autocorrelation 
of residuals. DW statistic numbers are between 1.746 and 2.397 (4-DL).
Descriptive statistics
Table 6 shows the mean and standard deviation of the debt variables (dependent variables), 
which were calculated at book value, and Table 7 shows independent variables: operating 
margin, size, tangibility, ROE, growth, Tobin’s Q, and Altman Z.
Debt indicators show changes during the analyzed periods. It can be observed that in times of 
crisis the means are higher. It shows that debt was higher in this period. The standard deviation 
does not influence the analysis, since the sample was diverse and composed of companies from 
various industries and sizes.




 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables
Dependent Variable
Normality Period Crisis Period
Mean Standard Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Short-Term Debt 0.091 0.077 0.103 0.096
Long-Term Debt 0.203 0.131 0.226 0.169
Total Debt 0.294 0.157 0.329 0.193
In the descriptive statistics of the independent variables, it may be observed that all have 
changed in the compared periods. The operating margin shows a substantial change. It shows 
negative percentage in times of global crisis and in Brazilian economic recession. Considering 
the other indicators, several show lower mean in the crisis period; thus it may be considered 
that these indicators were affected by government and situational macro environment.
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics of independent variables
Independent Variable
Normality Period Crisis Period
Mean Standard Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Operating margin 0.112 0.412 0.111 0.202
Size 21.516 1.600 21.651 1.644
Tangiblity 0.412 0.334 0.470 0.342
ROE 0.105 0.253 0.042 0.390
Growth 0.269 1.376 0.627 5.064
Tobin’s Q 1.750 7.816 1.106 0.550
Altman Z 2.002 1.980 2.059 2.006
Estimated coefficients













Short-Term Debt 4.832 0.681 Random 10.584 0.158 Random
Long-Term Debt 16.197 0.023 Fixed 13.947 0.052 Random
Total Debt 13.981 0.052 Random 18.103 0.012 Fixed
F.P. Ramos J.  et. al. /  Contaduría y Administración 64(1), 2019, 1-15
http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fca.24488410e.2018.1152  
10
The results of Long-Term Debt in normality period and Total Debt in crisis period reject 
the null hypothesis. It shows that there are correlations between the regressors and error term. 
It indicates to estimate of models in the fixed form. The other models, however, accept the null 
hypothesis, indicating for an estimate of random models.
Tables 9, 10, and 11 consider the estimated coefficients of the proposed regression model 
of dependent variables (short-term debt, long-term debt, and total debt). In the Short-Term 
Debt model, the variables that have significance effects are those with p-value lower than 
10%. Analyzing the normality period, operating margin, size, ROE, growth, and Altman Z 
were the variables that influenced the dependent variable. In the long-term debt it was noticed 
that operating margin, tangibility, ROE, growth, and Tobin’s Q were not significant. Finally, 
analyzing the total debt, operating margin, growth, and Tobin’s Q did not influence the 
regression model.
The behavior of indicators in crisis period was similar to the normality period. Both 
indicators were statistically significant. Independent variables with p-values greater than 
10% are not statistically significant. In both periods the variables that most influenced the 
independent variables and had more differentiation between the periods were operating margin, 
growth, and Tobin’s Q.
When the variable becomes statistically insignificant in a period, this variable is discarded, 
as it is not possible to consider it in comparison.
In the long-term debt (for the normality period), size is determinant of capital structure; 
However, in crisis period, Tobins’s Q also becomes a determinant of long-term debt, confirming 
the findings of Brito, Corrar, and Batistella (2007).
Table 9 
Estimated coefficients (Short-term Debt)
 Normality Period Crisis Period
 Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value
Const 0.239 6.366 0.000 0.342 3.722 0.000
Operating margin -0.016 -2.297 0.022 -0.034 -0.960 0.339
Size -0.006 -3.169 0.002 -0.012 -2.695 0.008
Tangibility -0.012 -1.410 0.159 -0.015 -0.746 0.457
ROE -0.058 -5.006 0.000 0.035 1.856 0.065
Growth 0.003 1.660 0.097 -0.002 -1.379 0.170
Tobin’s Q 0.000 -0.509 0.611 0.044 3.396 0.001
Altman Z -0.007 -5.326 0.000 -0.012 -3.272 0.001
R-squared 0.140   0.146   
Adjusted R-squared 0.131   0.112   
F-statistic 16.228   4.234   
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   
Effects 
Specification Random   Random   




Estimated coefficients (Long-term Debt)
Normality Period Crisis Period
Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value
Const -0.202 -2.888 0.004 -0.297 -1.998 0.047
Operating margin -0.013 -1.015 0.310 -0.046 -0.816 0.416
Size 0.021 6.329 0.000 0.019 2.797 0.006
Tangibility -0.016 -1.065 0.287 0.034 1.073 0.285
ROE -0.007 -0.293 0.769 0.013 0.424 0.672
Growth 0.002 0.560 0.575 0.000 -0.197 0.844
Tobin’s Q 0.000 -0.179 0.858 0.128 6.186 0.000
Altman Z -0.019 -7.815 0.000 -0.026 -4.274 0.000
R-squared 0.291 0.254
Adjusted R-squared 0.146 0.224
F-statistic 2.002 8.429
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000
Effects Specification Fixed Random
Table 11 
Estimated coefficients (Total Debt)
Normality Period Crisis Period
Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value
Const -0.022 -0.289 0.773 -0.189 -0.733 0.466
Operating margin -0.021 -1.509 0.132 0.088 0.997 0.322
Size 0.018 5.135 0.000 0.018 1.519 0.134
Tangibility -0.035 -2.132 0.033 0.028 0.604 0.548
ROE -0.091 -3.938 0.000 -0.313 -3.051 0.003
Growth 0.004 0.959 0.338 -0.029 -1.179 0.243
Tobin’s Q 0.000 -0.500 0.617 0.199 5.553 0.000
Altman Z -0.025 -8.930 0.000 -0.038 -4.385 0.000
R-squared 0.156 0.857
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.604
F-statistic 18.402 3.396
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000
Effects Specification Random Fixed




Through the analysis of the regression coefficients, it was possible to determine the 
relationship between the dependent variables and each of the explanatory factors (independent 
variables). Negative sign (-) shows a negative relationship, positive sign (+) shows a positive 
relationship and SI (statistically insignificant) means that there was no significance. Table 
12 shows three columns of data: the first shows the expected relationship according to the 
hypotheses mentioned in the Methodology, the second shows the observed relationship in the 
normality period, and, finally, the third shows the observed relationship in the crisis period.
Table 12 




Observed Relationship in the 
normality periods (2007, 2009–2014)













margin - - SI SI SI SI SI
Size + - + + - + SI
Tangibility - SI SI - SI SI SI
ROE - - SI - + SI -
Growth - + SI SI SI SI SI
Tobin’s Q + SI SI SI + + +
Altman Z - - - - - - -
The result shows that the determinants of the capital structures are different between the 
normality period and the crisis period. Some variables did not reject the hypotheses mentioned 
in the Methodology. Following the premises of the Pecking Order Theory, the Operating margin 
variable, which measures the operating profit margin, should be negative. Brealey and Myers 
(2006) point out that, according to the Pecking Order Theory, companies with higher operating 
margin tend to finance themselves (reinvestment) rather than through third-party capital. Table 
12 shows that in Brazil this assumption is true, since the coefficient is negative. The greater 
the company’s operating margin, the lower the debt. However, in the normality period, the 
regression model showed a negative relationship: thus the hypothesis was not rejected. In fact, 
the model showed that there is a proportional relationship between the operating margin and 
debt indicators, but it was observed only in normality periods for a short-term debt. In other 
models statistics were not significant.
The Size variable also adhered well to the assumptions of theories. The great size of a 
company makes it easier to obtain financing, making the company more leveraged. These 
results are also in agreement with studies of Ozkan (2001) and Gaud et al. (2005). However, 
in the models with Short-Term Debt variable this hypothesis is rejected. The same occurred 
with the Tangibility variable. Less tangible companies tend to have higher level of leverage. 
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However, the tangibility parameter can assume positive or negative values, as presented by 
Titman & Wessels (1988).
In relation to Tobin’s Q, which demonstrates the expected investment opportunity, it is 
observed that the positive values of Tobin’s Q corroborate the Pecking Order Theory, which 
states that the investment opportunity ratio should be positive in relation to the leverage level. 
Although the Growth variable was not significant in crisis periods, the positive value in 
the normality period does not corroborate the Pecking Order Theory. The higher the revenue 
growth, the lower will be the dependence on debts. Therefore, this leads to a reduction in the 
leverage level.
The ROE variable also confirms the Pecking Order Theory, which states that more profitable 
companies are less indebted. This theory argues that companies should not seek external 
financing, without first exhausting their own resources. Therefore, higher operating margin 
tends to decrease leverage.
Similar to the ROE variable, the Altman Z variable is also in agreement with the theory. 
High scores reduce the level of credit risk and leverage. Therefore, if companies have more 
debts, they will have worse scores of credit risk.
It may be observed that the relationship of some dependent variables (short-term debt, long-
term debt, and total debt) with the independent variables in the analyzed periods was different. 
Thus, the negative macroeconomic influences affect the determinants of the capital structures. 
Espinola (2013) used a sample of US companies and confirmed that in times of financial crisis 
determinants also changed, and operating margin, size, and tangibility had more significance 
than the others.
The initial hypotheses of variables (operating margin and ROE) were not rejected. Regarding 
the operating margin variable, Myers (1984), Donaldson (1961), and Brealey and Myers (2006) 
suggest that firms prefer raising capital, firstly from retained earnings, secondly from debt, 
and thirdly from issuing new equity. This relationship occurs because of the transaction costs 
involved in issuing equity, according to Myers and Majluf (1984). However, in periods of 
economic expansion in Brazil, companies tend to use both equity and short-term debts. During 
this period, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) provides credit at low costs. 
Conclusions
This paper analyzed the determinants of the capital structures of Brazilian companies. In 
addition, the study compared different economic periods (normality and crisis) in order to 
determine whether there was variation in indebtedness related to the independent variables. 
The results of the tests indicated a change in the ratio of some independent variables. 
One of the contributions of this research is demonstrating that through statistical tests it is 
possible to observe changes in the capital structure determinants in different economic periods. 
In addition, it is emphasized that the factors chosen for the research show only some variables 
that influence corporate debt. The variables that explain the debt in the crisis period were size, 
ROE, Tobin’s Q, and Altman Z. According to Espinola (2013), size was also a very significant 
variable in determining the capital structure.
Many of the hypotheses mentioned in the Methodology were not rejected by determining 
correlation with capital structure theories. The hypotheses were more substantiated in the 
Pecking Order Theory, Static Trade-off Theory, and Agency Theory.
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The aims of research were achieved: through the proposed regression model, we found 
capital structure determinants of Brazilian publicly-held companies. The general hypothesis 
built in the introduction was not rejected because there was a change in the relationship of the 
capital structure determinants when comparing the normality period (2007, 2009–2014) with 
the crisis period (2008 and 2015).
Finally, this research field is large and diverse. Therefore, there is opportunity to develop 
new capital structure theories or delve into the existing theories, adapting them to increase 
the value of companies based on the choice of optimal debt point. In addition, this research 
is restricted to Brazilian companies. We also suggest testing the hypotheses presented here 
in companies of Latin American countries. Thus, it will be possible to determine whether the 
capital structure theories are also divergent from the American reality.
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